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Terrorism Review

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10 January 1985

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| | 10 January 1985 | |
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| | Terrorism Review | 25X |
| | 10 January 1985 | |
| Focus | South America: Escalating Drug-Related Violence | 25X |
| | The use of terrorist tactics by South American drug traffick markedly in recent months, threatening both the success of control programs and the security of US officials in the region apparently, the acts of violence have not been coordinated, the matter of time before government and foreign officials—especies the targets of more systematic terrorist campaigns. | US-backed drug- on. Thus far, out it may be only a |
| | The threat is greatest in Colombia, where traffickers have be campaign of violence and intimidation they started after the cracking down on their activities last April. Bogota has not pressure despite threats to kill President Betancur and US a personnel. Although they undoubtedly recognize that their a Washington—such as the bombing of the US Embassy last weaken US resolve to support drug-control efforts in Colomb | government began yielded to their nd other diplomatic attempts to intimidate month—have failed to |

In Peru, the murder of 19 members of a US-financed coca eradication team last month temporarily halted antinarcotics operations in the upper Huallaga River valley, the country's key coca-producing region. Such violence has not been characteristic of the Peruvian traffickers. Perhaps they were inspired or even instigated by Colombian traffickers operating in Peru.

not likely to give up; instead, they will probably conclude that even more

spectacular action is needed to disrupt the antidrug campaign.

Drug-related violence has not been as widespread in Bolivia as in Colombia, but the recent attempted kidnaping of a Bolivian legislator may indicate that Bolivian traffickers are becoming more aggressive. Moreover, the recently discovered plot by Colombian traffickers to assassinate the US Ambassador in La Paz illustrates the potential for violence to spread to areas that had been less affected.

As long as antinarcotics enforcement efforts threaten the lucrative operations of the South American traffickers, they can be expected to respond with violence and intimidation on a continually broader and more intensive scale. It may be that such terrorism will ultimately do them no good, but there is considerable scope for more escalation before they find that out. And it is at least equally likely that this violence will—as in Peru—bring them at least temporary success.

| Highlights | |
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| Alert Items | |
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Key Indicators

West Germany

RAF Terrorist Campaign Focuses on US and NATO Targets

In December, members of the Red Army Faction hardcore, along with peripheral supporters and sympathizers, conducted about a dozen terrorist attacks against US, NATO, and German establishment targets. Among the most noteworthy were a car bomb attack on a NATO training site in Oberammergau, which failed owing to a timer malfunction, an incendiary attack against the residence of the US Consul General in Frankfurt, and the bombing of a French Embassy Annex in Bonn-Bad Godesberg. The attacks were in solidarity with a hunger strike begun 4 December by 39 RAF prisoners who are demanding political-prisoner status.

RAF documents confiscated last summer described plans for such a coordinated campaign, which is to end with an unspecified spectacular terrorist event that will lead to freeing the RAF prisoners. Whether or not such a culminating event takes place, lesser terrorist events are expected to continue or even increase in frequency and seriousness as the condition of the starving prisoners deteriorates. (For more details, see article elsewhere in this issue.)

Significant Developments

Italy

Another Train Bombing Blamed on Rightwing Extremists

On 23 December, an explosion ripped through a rear car of a passenger train while it was passing through a long mountain tunnel south of Bologna. At least 17 persons were killed and more than 100 injured. Telephone callers claimed credit for bombing the train in the name of numerous terrorist groups (some believed defunct) across the political spectrum, but authorities believe that the incident, like a similar bombing 10 years ago near Bologna that claimed 80 lives, was probably the work of neofascists who object to Bologna's Communist government.

Jordan-Syria

Senior PLO Official Assassinated; Fatah May Retaliate

On 29 December, two unidentified gunmen killed Fahd al Qawasmeh, member of the PLO Executive Committee and deported former mayor of Hebron, outside his home in Amman. The gunmen first threw a grenade at his car and then shot him with silencer-equipped pistols.

An unknown organization calling itself "Black September"—the name used by the long defunct covert terrorist arm of Fatah—claimed credit. It is probable, however, that the assassins were Syrian-backed Palestinian terrorists, perhaps operatives of the Abu Nidal Group, which Syria has been using to carry out terrorist attacks against moderate Arab officials. More such attacks are likely. Just three days before Qawasmeh was killed, Jordanian police defused a bomb near the home of PLO political adviser Hani al Hassan.

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12: CIA-RDP85-01095R000100210002-0 Secret 25X1 **Anti-Druze Car Bombings Continue** Lebanon Two more car bombs aimed at Druze targets killed 10 and wounded 40 in two Druze towns. On 21 December, a Mercedes loaded with more than 200 kilograms of explosives killed six and wounded 32, including 19 schoolchildren, when it exploded near a Druze school in a town near Beirut. Claiming responsibility for the blast was the "Yazbeki Revolutionary Organization," the previously unheardof group that claimed credit for a bombing in Beirut on 12 December allegedly targeted against Druze leader Walid Junblatt. On 29 December another bombladen Mercedes exploded outside government offices in the Druze mountain town of Shuwayfat. No group has claimed credit for that attack, which killed four and wounded seven. 25X1 Sendero Luminoso Starts New Year With Atrocity Peru According to government sources, on 1 January Sendero Luminoso guerrillas beheaded 21 peasants, including the mayor's wife, after a dawn attack on the town of Pampacoris, about 180 kilometers south of Ayacucho. The guerrillas dragged people from their homes and after a summary trial sentenced accused Army collaborators to death. After beheading the 21 villagers, the guerrillas set fire to the townhall and to five houses and then fled before reinforcements could arrive. Pampacoris was apparently attacked because, under the guidance of the Army, it had formed a local self-defense force. Sendero Luminoso terrorists had attacked

Namibia

SWAPO Bombs Busy Post Office

members of this force.

On 31 December a bomb explosion in the post office at Ondangwae killed five persons and injured at least 15. South African authorities blamed the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) for the unusually bloody attack, and SWAPO's president virtually acknowledged responsibility. Reportedly, SWAPO recently formed a special urban terrorist unit, and this unit may have been responsible for the bombing.

the town twice during the previous two weeks and had already killed 25 accused

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Chukaku-ha Rockets US Consulate General in Kobe

Early on the morning of 1 January, three incendiary or explosive rockets were fired at the American Consulate General in Kobe. The leftwing terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction of the Revolutionary Army) claimed credit for the attack, which caused no damage or casualties. (For more details see article elsewhere in this issue.)

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| New | RAF | Terror | Cam | paign | |

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The Red Army Faction and its peripheral supporters have launched a long-planned publicity and terrorist campaign with the ultimate goal of winning the release of RAF members in West German jails. The campaign started 4 December in the special highsecurity courthouse in Stuttgart-Stammheim, when Christian Klar and Brigitte Mohnhaupt, who are currently on trial there, declared they were beginning a hunger strike in which they would henceforth take only warm water. They were soon joined by about 30 more RAF prisoners around the country. In support of the hunger strikers, members of the fugitive hardcore and close supporters began a bombing and arson campaign against Western and NATO-related targets in West Germany. The first of at least a dozen attacks that occurred during December was a bombing of a Siemens company warehouse in Frankfurt on 17 December.

The Oberammergau Car Bomb

The most significant attack came a day later in the Bavarian mountain resort town of Oberammergau. There, the RAF "guerrilla" (as the hardcore calls itself) mounted its first major terrorist attack in more than three years when it tried to set off a car bomb at the NATO officers' training school. A stolen car bearing separately stolen temporary USAREUR license plates and a forged temporary registration sticker was driven onto the compound by a man wearing a US Marine Corps uniform, who aroused suspicion when he subsequently departed hurriedly on foot. Owing to a malfunction in the time-delay activating mechanism, the bomb, hidden in the trunk, did not detonate. It was composed of 25 kilograms of Dynamite-3, some bottles of butane gas, and a bucket of bolts. Had the bomb gone off, the results could have been devastating.

The explosives were part of 800 kilograms of Dynamite-3 stolen last summer from a quarry in Belgium. A car bomb in Paris last August, which Action Directe claimed to have planted, contained explosives from the same source, implying a degree of linkage or cooperation among German, French, and possibly Belgian leftist terrorists. Because the attack in Oberammergau failed, there is a possibility that the hardcore may soon try again.

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Since the car bomb attack in Oberammergau, at least 11 more bombing and incendiary attacks have been directed against Western targets in West Germany. Six of the attacks were bombings of facilities at US and UK military bases, which caused damage—sometimes substantial—but no casualties. Other targets included a German Government regional data center in Reutlingen, and four diplomatic targets—the French technical mission (an annex of the French Embassy) in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, the residences of the US and French Consuls General in Frankfurt, and the Turkish Consulate in Muenster.

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Plans for the current RAF terrorist campaign were outlined in RAF documents captured by police last 25X1 summer, and both prisoners and overt sympathizers had made no secret of their intent to carry out these plans. (Dogged persistence is a key characteristic of the group.) Originally, a three-phase campaign was envisaged. First, the prisoners would go on a hunger strike to obtain political-prisoner status and force the government to put them together in one place. Second, the "resistance," as the RAF refers to its peripheral supporters, would generate a rising swell of publicity by conducting low-level terrorist attacks against Allied governmental and economic institutions in West European NATO countries. The RAF campaign would culminate when the guerrilla mounted an unspecified terrorist spectacular that would win the freedom of their imprisoned comrades. This would presumably entail a kidnaping or hostage taking in order to obtain someone to trade for the prisoners.

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| In fact, what seems to be occurring is a three-pronged effort by the prisoners, the guerrilla, and the resistance, with all phases being carried out simultaneously. We do not know whether the hardcore is still planning a spectacular attack to gain hostages or not, but to do the prisoners any good such an attack must occur fairly soon. Whether or not the hardcore strikes again, the intensity and frequency of attacks by the peripheral supporters will probably increase as the physical condition of the hunger strikers deteriorates. |
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| Portugal: | | |
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| FP-25 at a | Crossroads | |
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Lisbon's aggressive campaign last summer against the leftwing terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) resulted in the arrests of many of its members and most if not all of its leaders. Yet it led to an only brief reduction in terrorist violence in Portugal. The arrests apparently failed to destroy the operational core of the group, which was a covert part of the legal political party Forces of Popular Unity (FUP). Subsequent to the police sweep, members of the group have continued to operate;

was an industrialist who was blinded by a bomb placed at the door of his home. In February 1984 a bank employee was killed during one of two well-planned bank robberies that netted the group more than \$800,000. In April an FP-25 bombing of a landowner's home near Evora led to the death of an elderly woman and a baby. In May the group assassinated a retired industrialist. In June FP-25 shot and wounded the administrator of a glass company involved in a labor dispute. Many other attacks caused damage but no casualties.

Background

FP-25 announced its arrival in Portugal in April 1980 by detonating more than 100 leaflet bombs. The leaflets asserted the group's claim to represent "the exploited Portuguese workers" who had fought for the revolution that began on 25 April 1974. The leaflets said that members of the old "fascist" regime were returning to power and called on the workers to respond to this by counteracting "bourgeois violence with worker violence." During the next two years FP-25 killed policemen, assassinated industrialists, bombed buildings, robbed banks, and in general comported itself as a typical West European leftwing terrorist group. Between mid-1982 and late 1983, mysteriously, FP-25 was less active. Some Portuguese observers speculated that during this time members of the group were receiving training abroad.

The Government Counteroffensive

operations."

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elements of the Judiciary Police, the Security Police, and the National Guard launched a coordinated sweep that resulted in the detention of more than 40 persons, including Lt. Col. Otelo Saraiva Carvalho (commonly known simply as Otelo), the military strategist of the 1974 Portuguese revolution. The main targets of the operation were the installations of the FUP. Later in the summer, other suspected FP-25

members were arrested, including an alleged "chief of

On 19 June the government struck. Combined

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Escalation in Terrorist Activity

Beginning in November 1983, FP-25 violence suddenly became more frequent, sophisticated, and vicious. Numerous bombings were directed against government and business targets; among the victims

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| | US Embassy Targeted. On 27 October a radio station | 25 X |
| | received a telephone call from an alleged member of | |
| | FP-25 who said that explosives had been placed near | |
| | the American Embassy. The radio station identified | |
| | the device as a car bomb, and, in searching for the car | |
| | bomb, the police overlooked two rocket-propelled | |
| | grenades that had been placed nearby and aimed at | |
| | the Embassy. The grenades were not discovered until | |
| | the following morning. Upon inspection, police | • |
| • | discovered that the detonating circuit had been | |
| On 15 October 1984, 77 persons, including Otelo, | completed, but the rockets had failed to fire because | |
| were charged with membership in FP-25. Many of | of a broken connecting wire. FP-25 claimed credit for | |
| them were also members of the FUP. Otelo's lawyer | the action in calls to various radio stations, and | |
| claimed that his client had dissolved all formal ties | forensic evidence confirmed the claim. | 25 X |
| with the FUP in 1982, although he continued to | | |
| attend party meetings and was present at the news | On 25 November, the anniversary of the aborted | |
| conference where the FUP endorsed FP-25 as an | leftwing coup in 1975, FP-25 attacked the US | |
| instrument of the popular will. Otelo denied that he | Embassy again—this time by firing four 60-mm | |
| was even a member of FP-25, much less one of its | mortar rounds at the Embassy compound. Three | |
| founders and leaders. According to press reports, | rounds fell within the Embassy wall, and a fourth | |
| however, a search of Otelo's home turned up firm | exploded outside the front gate. No one was injured, | |
| evidence linking Otelo with FP-25. | and damage was slight. In claiming responsibility for | 25 X |
| m = - | the attack, FP-25 condemned alleged US involvement | |
| The Terrorism Continues | in putting down the 1975 coup attempt and demanded | 25 X 1 |
| Shortly after the police crackdown | that Portugal withdraw from NATO. On 9 December | |
| the operational core of the group had | the group emphasized this demand by firing four | 25 X |
| evaded arrest by fleeing the country | 60-mm mortar shells at NATO's Iberian | 25 X 1 |
| | Headquarters, which is located in a suburb of Lisbon. | |
| number of members did indeed escape to | Only one round landed within the compound; the | |
| Mozambique, although they are now believed to have | other three rounds overshot the target. Damage was | |
| returned to Portugal. Nevertheless, as early as July | slight, and there were no injuries. | 25 X ° |
| remnants of the group resumed shootings and | E La Bi La A | |
| bombings, again concentrating on Portuguese | Evolution or Dissolution? | 0.5 |
| establishment targets. On 15 October, however, the | the FP-25 operatives | 25 X |
| same day that the 77 accused members were | still at large no longer consider themselves to be | |
| arraigned, FP-25 operatives attacked foreign targets | subordinate to the organization's political-ideological | |
| for the first time since 1981. Five bombs—two of | leaders. Instead, they seem to be trying to reconstitute | |
| which exploded—were placed at French business | themselves as a typical West European autonomous | |
| installations in Portugal. In claiming responsibility for | leftwing terrorist group. The remaining active cells | • |
| the bombings, FP-25 asserted its solidarity with ETA, the Spanish Basque separatist terrorist group, several | currently appear to be operating in a fashion | 25 X 1 |
| | reminiscent of that of West Germany's Revolutionary | |
| of whose members France had just decided to extradite to Spain. | Cells, and they seem to be motivated by similar "anti- | 0.51/ |
| extraurte to Spani. | Imperialist" and anti-NATO sentiments. | 25X |
| ¹ Following the April 1974 coup, Otelo had been a member of the | | 25 X |
| Armed Forces Movement (MFA) triumverate and the head of | | |
| Copcon, the junta's police organ. On 25 November 1975 he led an unsuccessful effort to overthrow the junta and install himself on the | | |
| unsuccessful effort to overthrow the junta and install himself as the head of a leftist government. Instead, he was driven from power by | | |
| conservative military officers led by the current President, Antonio | | |
| dos Santos Ramalho Eanes. Copcon was disbanded, and Otelo was imprisoned briefly. | | 053 |
| imprisoned diffuj. | | 25 X |
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| | | | The arrests of last summer severed the terrorist cells of FP-25 from the political movement that had spawned them. Now anchorless, responsible to no one, they are free of any constraints on their activities that | |
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| effecti contro and m accoun | ve. The loss of stro l, previously exerci ililtary leaders now | ons have not been very ng centralized guidance and sed by the national political v in detention, probably with an apparent decline in ce the arrests. | Otelo and the other political leaders who aspired to head a legitimate Portuguese government might have | |
| | | | autonomous, self-supporting organization. Such groups have done considerable damage and demonstrated considerable staying power in other countries. On the other hand, having lost its original | 2 |
| remain by the | ning FP-25 operation police. Although t | en issued for some of the ves who have been identified hey have been able to evade | raison d'etre, the group may just fade away gradually, as many other similar groups have done. In that event, the FP-25 terrorism of the past few months will come to be seen in retrospect as no more than the parting | 25 X 1 |
| | by keeping continue status limits thei | r capabilities. | shots of some resentful survivors. |] 2 |
| | | | | 25 X 1 |
| 1980 | 21 April | About 110 leaflet bombs ex | vents Believed To Involve FP-25 explode in towns throughout Portugal. Leaflets declare sent the workers of the country who fought for the | |
| | 5 May | Cacem. Two banks robbed | . National Guardsman killed. | |
| | 9 May | Braganca. Attempted leafle | et bombing. | |
| | 10 May | Paro and Portimao. Bomb | threats to homes of policemen. | |
| | 15 May | Martim Longo. National C | Guardsman murdered. | |
| | 4 September | Guimaraes, Paro, and Vise | eu. Police stations bombed. | |
| | 9 September | Vila Viocosa. Ducal Palace | e robbed. | |
| | 11 September | Evora. Attempted leaflet be | ombing. | |
| | 9 October | Malveira. Two banks robbe | ed. Three dead, including two of the robbers. | |

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
| 1981 | 15 January | Santa Iria da Azoia. Bank robbed, netting about \$5,000. |
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| | 30 January | Shipyard robbed, netting about \$60,000. |
| | 3 February | Lisbon. Chancery of Brazilian Embassy bombed. Bank of Brazil bombed. |
| | 6 February | Rio do Mouro. Bank robbed, netting about \$4,500. |
| | 17 February | Guimaraes. National Guard garage bombed. Association of Former Students bombed. |
| | | Porto. National Guard facility bombed. |
| | 14 March | Evora. Attempted bombing of a National Guard station. |
| | 19 March | Malveira. Attempted assassination of person credited with killing one of the FP-25 robbers on 9 October 1980. |
| | 25 March | Lisbon. Attempted assassination of Manuel Sanches Ingles Baquivel, head of SAPEC, a large chemical firm. |
| | | Bank employees who activate alarms during a holdup threatened with death. |
| | 26 March | Members of Management Council of Petrogal (national petroleum company) threatened with death unless they accede to workers' demands. |
| | 7 April | Lisbon. Bomb threat in name of FP-25 made against TWA Flight 901, Lisbon to New York. No bomb found. |
| | 17 April | Porto. Attempted assassination of Arnaldo da Silva Rodrigues, who had killed a leftwing militant during a brawl. |
| | 6 May | Lisbon. Attempted bombing of Royal British Club in protest against the death from self-imposed starvation of Bobby Sands, imprisoned Provisional IRA terrorist. |
| | 21 May | Santa Iria da Aroia. Bank robbed, netting about \$2,500. |
| | 29 May | Gondozar. Factory robbed, netting about \$18,000. |
| | 1 June | Povoa de Santo Adriao. Bank robbed, netting about \$9,000. In claiming credit, FP-25 admitted "recovering" only about \$600. |
| | 8 June | Venda Novas. Attempted bombing of National Guard barracks. |
| | 12 June | Porto. Bank robbed, netting about \$1,000. |
| | 13 June | Porto. Seventeen transceivers worth about \$3,500 stolen. |

| | 18 June | Lisbon. Portuguese Security Policeman shot while conducting road check. Weapons, documents, and a woman linked to FP-25 captured. |
|------|--------------|--|
| | 6 July | Fogueteiro. Bank robbed, netting about \$2,500. |
| | 13 July | Pegoes. Bank robbed. |
| | 14 July | Arcozelo. Bank robbed, netting about \$50,000. |
| | 19 July | Montemor-O-Novo. Three hundred kilograms of explosives stolen from a quarry. |
| | 24 July | Vila da Feira. Bank robbed, netting about \$85,000. |
| | 28 July | Brago. Administrator of textile firm shot in legs in assassination attempt. |
| | 29 July | Alvor. Two banks robbed simultaneously. |
| | 28 September | Estremoz. Attempted bombing of National Guard barracks. |
| | 3 October | Mafra. Car bomb kills two National Guardsmen. |
| | 13 October | Povoa de Santo Adriao. Bank robbed, netting about \$17,000. |
| | 28 October | Tojeda. Attempted assassination of industrialist Joao Mesquita Oliveria. Responsibility claimed by Comando Carlos of FP-25. |
| | 29 October | Mortuaga. Bank robbed. |
| | 21 November | Conviha and Fundao. National Guard stations bombed. |
| | 30 November | Alcobaca. Bank robbed. |
| | 14 December | Lisbon. Security Police squadron bombed. |
| | 31 December | Alcacer do Sol. National Guard station bombed. |
| 1982 | 7 February | Lisbon. Attempted assassination (by bombing) of head of national association of trade unions. FP-25 first claimed, later denied, responsibility. |
| | 19 April | Estoril, Pinhal Novo, and Setubal. Homes of SAPEC managers bombed. |
| | 6 December | Almada. Administrator of a china factory assassinated. |
| | 17 December | Lisbon. Bomb threat to US Embassy. No bomb found. |
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| 1983 | 7 January | Ovar. Bomb hoax at chapel. |
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| | 25 January | Lisbon. Bomb threat to Chilean Embassy. No bomb found. |
| | 28 February | Porto. Three cars stolen from a garage. |
| | 7 November | Lisbon. Prominent industrialist Dom Pedro De Braganca blinded by bomb explosion in assassination attempt. A passer-by also injured. |
| | 7 November | Lisbon. Home of manager of a metal fittings company bombed. |
| | 12 November | Leiria. National Guard headquarters bombed. |
| | 16 November | Lisbon. Cars belonging to company involved in labor dispute destroyed by bombing. |
| | 18 November | Lisbon. Labor Ministry building bombed. |
| | 6 December | Lisbon. Twenty-four bombs explode in five municipalities in Lisbon as warnings to employers in protest against delays in paying salaries to industrial workers. |
| 1984 | 25 January | Leiria. Home of manufacturer strafed with gunfire to protest firing of employees. |
| | 1 February | Lisbon. Security firm robbed of \$800,000. FP-25 claim authenticated by evidence. |
| | 28 February | Vilamoura. Bank robbed, netting about \$15,000. One bank employee died from shotgun blast in the back. |
| | 16 March | Lisbon. Private residence bombed. |
| | | Beja. Home of farmer bombed to dissuade him from pursuing legal efforts to regain land distributed to workers after 1974 revolution. |
| | 30 April | Evora. Home of landowner bombed. Baby and old woman killed incidentally. |
| | 29 May | Lisbon. Retired industrialist assassinated. |
| | 1 June | Lisbon. Attempted assassination of businessman accused of misusing funds and being in arrears on salary payments to employees. |
| | 4 July | Barcelos. National Guard post strafed by attackers in car using automatic weapons. |
| | 4 July | Viana do Castelo. Home of industrialist bombed. |
| | | |

| 13 September | Beja. Home of landowner bombed. |
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| 24 September | Southern Portugal. Homes of three landowners bombed. Six persons injured. |
| 15 October | Lisbon. Bombs placed at five French business installations. Two exploded, causing minor damage. In claiming credit, FP-25 declared solidarity with Basque separatists who were fighting extradition from France. |
| 22 October | Evora. Landowner's home bombed. |
| 27 October | Lisbon. Two rocket grenades aimed at US Embassy misfired, owing to broken circuit in the time-delay activation mechanism. |
| 30 October | Lisbon. Bomb threat against manager and employees of Texas Instruments in Portugal. |
| 25 November | Lisbon. US Embassy compound struck by four 60-mm mortar rounds. Little damage, no casualties. |
| 9 December | Oeiras, near Lisbon. Four mortar rounds fired at NATO's Iberian-Atlantic Command Post. One hit but caused little damage; the other three overshot. |
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| The Kurds Turn | |
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| Toward Terrorism | |

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Kurdish rebels along the Turkey-Iraq border are growing increasingly radical and for the first time may threaten US interests in Turkey.

Syria and Iran are funneling arms, personnel, and funds to the Kurds. In addition, an alliance is developing between Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas and Turkish leftists.

The latest surge in Kurdish militancy can be traced to the Iran-Iraq war. Baghdad has lost control of outlying parts of its northern provinces. This has enabled Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla chief Masoud Barzani to seize territory along the Turkish border. Barzani has turned his enclave into a haven for various Iraqi opposition groups, including the Iraqi Communists and Kurdish socialists. Moreover, a number of leftwing Kurdish extremists from Turkey have moved into the enclave. Some are survivors of the Turkish Army crackdown of 1980 who had been hiding out in the rugged mountains of southeastern Turkey since then; others were apparently dispatched to northern Iraq by Syria.

We believe that Syria, under pressure from Iran, is abetting the growing contacts between Turkish leftists and Iraqi Kurds. The Syrians support numerous terrorist groups both inside Syria and in Lebanon, including Turkish Communists and the leftwing

The Turks allege that the Soviet Union is behind the current Kurdish militancy with the goal of undermining NATO's southern defenses, but there is little evidence of this. It is true that in the past Moscow maintained contact with and supplied weapons to the Kurds because of their potential to destabilize Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Some contacts probably continue, but it is not now in the Soviet interest to incite the Kurds in Iraq to rebellion, since Iraq is one of Moscow's strongest allies in the Middle East

elements of both are now to be found in Barzani's enclave. In the past, the Kurdish rebels pursued their goals mainly through guerrilla warfare. The introduction of leftwing radicals into the Kurdish opposition, however, is likely to lead to a change in tactics. Now we expect the Kurds to turn more toward high-visibility terrorist tactics with the goal of obtaining heavier coverage in the media. In mid-August, for example, about a hundred Turkish Kurds slipped out of Barzani's enclave and simultaneously attacked several military posts in Turkey, killing a number of soldiers. In addition, several foreigners have recently been

Armenian terrorist group ASALA.

The Kurds have not hitherto attacked US interests in Turkey, but this restraint might end if the Kurds decide that targeting US facilities and personnel would advance their cause. Unlike the traditional Kurdish rebels, the new leftwing elements supported by Syria and Iran are accustomed to considering the United States as an enemy.

kidnaped by Kurdish rebels. Even if the Kurds do decide to adopt terrorist tactics, however, we do not

expect any significant terrorist campaign to begin

before next spring, when the weather improves.

Ankara responded to the mid-August raids along the border with a harsh military crackdown in Kurdish areas. That, along with resentment of the government's failure to improve their poor economic conditions, has led to widespread sympathy for the rebels among Turkey's 5 million Kurds. Ankara is considering even more draconian measures, such as forcibly clearing all Kurds from a 25-kilometer strip along the Iraqi border. Such a move, which would be reminiscent of the massive deportations of Armenians and Kurds from Turkey in the 1930s, would trigger widespread criticism in leftist West European media as well as possible retaliation from European terrorists in sympathy with leftwing Turkish radicals.


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Secret GI TR 85-001 10 January 1985

| | Japan: Chukaku-ha's Standoff Incendiary Devices | | | 25 X 1 |
|---|--|------------|--|---------------|
| terrorist gro Faction) has sophistication inclination t | last year or so, a leftwing Japanese up calling itself Chukaku-ha (Nucleus demonstrated both growing on in its tactics and an increasing o attack US targets. In our judgment, it uses a serious threat to US facilities and | 2 Sept | A truck equipped to launch incendiary rockets burned up in front of an office building of the Ministry of Justice. One rocket was fired into the building, but it failed to explode. | |
| Just as radio carved out a organized, hequipped to Japan develowith their cuprotest the U "militarizationew airport, around the research around the research are around the research are around the research are research are research are research are research are research as a research are research as a research are research are research are research as a resea | | 19 Sept | A truck-mounted flame projector was used to attack the headquarters of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (see diagram). The ensuing fire burned out the seventh, eighth, and ninth floors of the building, causing an estimated \$2 million in damage. Two persons were injured; they were the first casualties associated with this type of attack. On the same day, a similar device was deployed against the Israeli Embassy, but it apparently malfunctioned. A | 25X |
| struggle with been their proposed sophisticated | hout such weapons; instead, arson has rimary tactic, and ever more d, improvised fire-projecting devices have | 8 Oct | small van parked nearby was set afire, but the device did no other damage. | 25V |
| Until last year, most of this group's arson attacks involved small, time-delayed firebombs, albeit often of some technical complexity. In 1984, however, Chukaku-ha used large truck-mounted rocket launchers and fire projectors, with mixed but | | o Oct | A rocket-launching truck was used to hurl six incendiary projectiles about 150 meters over an intervening building and wall onto the roof of a hangar at a Japanese military airfield. Three of the rockets hit the hangar, but none exploded or penetrated the roof. | 25X 25X |
| sometimes spectacular results, in five separate attacks on domestic and foreign diplomatic targets in the Tokyo area: | | | in Kobe ours on 1 January 1985, three incendiary te fired at the American Consulate General | |
| 1 Mar | In its first use of a truck-mounted standoff incendiary device, Chukaku-ha attacked and destroyed offices associated with the new Tokyo International Airport on the seventh and eighth floors of a Tokyo office building. The fifth and sixth floors were also extensively damaged. | in Kobe. C | hukaku-ha subsequently claimed ty for the attack, which caused no | 25X1 |



Front-mounted flamethrower.

One rocket landed intact inside the front wall of the compound and failed to explode. The remains of another were found in the street in front of the building; it had evidently exploded on or near the ground, for it left debris over a 30-meter radius. The remains of the third were found in the garden behind the building; it must have exploded or burned while high in the air, for no associated debris was found. According to the Consulate General, had any of the rockets penetrated the building it would have started a fire, and, had anyone been in the vicinity when one of the rockets exploded, he would have been injured.

Preliminary investigations indicated that the three rockets had been fired from a site in a public park about 160 meters behind the Consulate General. The three launch tubes were bracketed to boards braced against recoil blocks dug several inches into the ground and were connected to a box that apparently contained batteries and a mechanical timer.

A Significant Threat

Last summer, Chukaku-ha firebombed some US military communications facilities, and in 1983 it reportedly planned but then canceled an arson attack against the US Embassy. The attack against the Consulate General in Kobe confirms that the group will henceforth include US diplomatic facilities among its targets. Although its complicated devices often malfunction and cause little or no damage, the group's occasional spectacular successes (together with the fact that it appears able to prepare and mount standoff incendiary attacks almost at will) mean that it poses a serious threat to US facilities in Japan.

There are a few consoling notes. For one thing, as terrorists go, Chukaku-ha operatives apparently have an unusually high regard for their own safety—hence their emphasis on timed devices and standoff attacks. Second, the group appears to have no access to military weapons or explosives. Both of these factors limit the group's effectiveness. Moreover, so far at least, Chukaku-ha appears to have tried to avoid causing casualties. Most of its attacks have taken place during night hours when the target facilities are empty, or nearly so. On the other hand, according to unconfirmed press reports, at least one of the rockets fired at the Consulate General in Kobe may have contained 25 to 30 nuts or bolts. Whether these would have been intended to break windows or injure personnel is not known.

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
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On the basis of a superficial examination, the surviving rocket is about 60 centimeters long and consists of two sections. One section appears to be a wooden dowel, burned on the outside (probably meaning it had been inserted in the launcher tube), about 40 centimeters long and 3 centimeters in diameter. The second section, presumably containing the explosive/incendiary material, appears to be made of plastic plumbing pipe and is about 20 centimeters long and 7 centimeters in diameter.

Chukaku-ha's Truck-Mounted Flame Projector



How it functions

- 1. Timing device controls activation of system.
- Nickel-chromium wires across nozzles are heated until they glow.
- 3. Electromagnetic valves open, allowing propellant from . . .
- 4. Two 50-kiloliter liquid propane (LP) tanks to flow into . . .
- 5. Four 50-kiloliter liquid propane tanks containing mixture of LP and gasoline that then flows through . . .
- 6. Four nozzles and is ignited by the hot wires.
- Second timer controls a self-destruct device: second set of hot wires ignites matches, which in turn ignite solid fuel, which finally ignites container of gasoline.

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Chronology of Terrorism—1984-85

| | Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. | 25 X 1 |
|----------------|--|---------------|
| 1984 | | |
| 12 December | Iraq: Bomb explodes in downtown Baghdad, killing two children and wounding four. Announcing the event a week later, the Iraqi Government said it had arrested the perpetrators, who had confessed to receiving the explosive material from Tehran via Syria. The terrorists may be linked to the Iranian-backed Dawa Party, which has previously conducted bombings in Baghdad. | |
| Mid-December | Uganda: Two government informants killed by National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) firing squad. Presumably, the act was intended to intimidate others considering such collaboration. | 25X1 |
| 18 December | Chile: Three time bombs explode near special forces police station in Santiago. The first bomb killed one person and injured another. The second bomb injured three policemen as they tried to come to the aid of the victims of the first one. The third exploded nearly 30 minutes later, causing no injuries. | 25X1 |
| | Chile: FPMR bomb explodes in townhall in Rancagua, injuring 13 people. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front had telephoned a warning before the explosion, and the building was being evacuated at the time of the blast. | 25X1 |
| | Chile: Sixteen bombings occur overnight in six cities throughout Chile. The bombs caused considerable damage to buildings, but only minor injuries and no deaths. | 25 X 1 |
| | | |
| | | 25X1 |
| 18-25 December | Chile: Editor of government-owned newspaper kidnaped by FPMR, later released unharmed. On 18 December La Nacion editor Sebastiano Bertolone Galleti was taken from his home by five armed men who demanded (1) safe passage from Chile for the three FPMR members being sheltered by the Swedish Embassy and (2) publication by Chilean media of an FPMR manifesto. The Chilean Government refused both demands. Nevertheless, the kidnapers let Bertolone go on Christmas Day after Archbishop Fresno made a public call for his release and Agence France Press published the manifesto. | 25 X 1 |

| 19 December | Angola: UNITA attack on state-owned brewery in Huambo allegedly repelled with heavy casualties. According to a government report, 18 brewery workers were killed in the attack by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), but 50 UNITA guerrillas were also killed and another 71 captured by | 05.74 |
|----------------|--|---------------|
| | government forces. | 25 X 1 |
| 20 December | Colombia: New vigilante group claims credit for two bombings of residences in Cali. The previously unknown "Dissatisfied Youths of Colombia" (JIC), in pamphlets they left at the scene of one of the bombings, threatened to eliminate all | • |
| | drug dealers, kidnapers, and robbers. | 25 X 1 |
| 21 December | Sri Lanka: Tamil separatists hold police inspectors for ransom. Guerrillas from an unidentified Tamil liberation group kidnaped the two police officers in Jaffna and have demanded \$200,000 in gold for their release. The ransom demand was contained in a videocassette that confirmed that the two policemen were still alive. | |
| | | 25 X 1 |
| | They | |
| 23 December | Peru: Sendero Luminoso guerrillas kill 15 peasants in raid on Ayahuanco. They also set homes and the local school on fire. | 25X1 |
| | Uganda: Swedish employee of the World Food for Peace shot by unknown assailants in Karamoja region. He is in serious condition. | 25 X 1 |
| 24 December | Northern Ireland: Court of Appeals, doubting evidence provided by Supergrass, overturns convictions of 14 accused members of Ulster Volunteer Force. The court pointed out, however, that the law regarding evidence from such informers had not changed and that such evidence remained admissible. | 25X1 |
| | | |
| 25 December | West Germany: Turkish Consulate in Muenster slightly damaged by bomb of unknown provenance. The front door was knocked off its hinges. | 25X1 |
| | Northern Ireland: Former Irish National Liberation Army leader Dominic "Mad Dog" McGlinchey convicted of murder. He received a life sentence for his part in the 1972 murder of a postmistress in County Antrim. | 25X1 |
| 25-26 December | Iran: Two bombs in Tehran kill six, injure more than 50. A car bomb that exploded on Christmas Day caused all the casualties. A smaller bomb that went off the next day damaged houses and nearby cars, but caused no casualties. Iran blamed the United States for the explosions, which probably were the work of anti-Khomeini mujahedin. | 25X1 |
| 27 December | Spain: Assailants in Bermeo shoot bar owner to death. The press speculated that ETA was responsible. | 05.74 |
| | ETA was responsible. | 25 X 1 |
| | | |

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| 29 December | Angola: Americans, Britons, and Filipinos among at least 22 foreigners captured by UNITA after their plane lands in Cafunfo during an attack on the diamond mining town. UNITA announced that the captured passengers and crewmembers of an American civil freight transport would be marched to Jamba and eventually released. | 25 X 1 |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| 1985 3 January | Lebanon: Swiss Charge kidnaped in West Beirut by unidentified gunmen. Although no group has claimed responsibility, we suspect Hizballah may have been involved. | 25 X 1 |

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